CVE-2026-123158 (*sshole): How a 257-Byte Password Opens Root Access on Alpine Linux

CVE-2026-123158 (*sshole) is a high-severity authentication bypass in OpenSSH affecting musl-based Linux systems. A password longer than 256 bytes triggers a musl crypt() error that collides with the shadow sentinel value, granting unauthenticated root access.

CVE-2026-123158 (*sshole): How a 257-Byte Password Opens Root Access on Alpine Linux

CVE: CVE-2026-123158 (GHSA-4fcc-vm97-gx3x)
Severity: CVSS v3.1 — 8.1 High
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published: 2026-11-05
Fixed in: OpenSSH 10.6p2 (commit 4353fdc43)


TL;DR

OpenSSH running on musl-based Linux distributions (Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto) without PAM accepts any password between 257 and 1,024 bytes as a valid login for accounts whose /etc/shadow password field is set to *. This means root, key-only users, and LDAP-synced accounts can be accessed without knowing any credential.

The vulnerability has existed since 2016 but was discovered using AI-driven fuzzing. Exploitation attempts were observed less than nine hours after disclosure. A proof-of-concept is publicly available on GitHub.


What Is *sshole?

*sshole (pronounced "ess-ssh-hole") is a password authentication bypass in sshd — the OpenSSH server daemon — that affects systems using the musl C library instead of glibc, when PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) is disabled.

The bug allows an unauthenticated attacker to log in as any account whose shadow password field contains exactly * — a value conventionally used to mean "this account has no password and cannot be accessed via password login."

This includes:

  • root on Alpine Linux (which ships with root:* in /etc/shadow)
  • Key-only users created without a password (adduser --disabled-password)
  • The alpine user on official Alpine cloud images (AWS, Azure, GCP)
  • LDAP/Active Directory-synced users fetched via musl-nscd

On default Alpine configurations, gaining access to the alpine user provides passwordless doas privileges — meaning a single oversized password grants full root access.


How It Works: The Anatomy of a One-Byte Collision

The vulnerability is not a bug in any single component. It is a collision between three independent design decisions made across musl and OpenSSH between 2012 and 2016.

Step 1 — musl's crypt() Returns * on Failure (2012)

Since August 2012, musl's crypt() function returns the literal string "*" when password hashing fails — instead of NULL as POSIX requires. This was a deliberate design choice by musl developers.

musl also caps password input to 256 bytes for its SHA-256 and SHA-512 implementations (KEY_MAX). A password longer than 256 bytes causes the hash operation to fail, which returns "*".

Step 2 — OpenSSH Borrows a Salt for Locked Accounts (2016)

CVE-2016-6210 was a username enumeration vulnerability where sshd responded faster for valid usernames than invalid ones. The fix added a timing mitigation: when checking passwords for accounts without a usable hash (like those with * in /etc/shadow), sshd would borrow the salt from another account on the system that does have a real password hash.

This meant sshd would call crypt() with the submitted password and the borrowed salt — even for locked accounts — to maintain consistent timing.

Step 3 — The Collision

Here is where it all comes together:

  1. An attacker sends a password of 257–1,024 bytes to an account whose shadow field is *
  2. sshd borrows the salt from another account with a $5$ or $6$ hash
  3. musl's crypt() receives the long password + borrowed salt
  4. The password exceeds 256 bytes → hashing fails → returns "*"
  5. sshd compares strcmp("*", "*") — the returned value against the stored field
  6. They match → authentication succeeds
pw_password = "*"                          # alice has no password
salt = NULL                                # "*" is too short to be a salt
salt = pick_salt()                         # sshd borrows bob's: "$6$abc$"
hash = crypt("AAAA…x300", "$6$abc$")       # musl: key > 256 bytes -> returns "*"
strcmp(hash, pw_password) == 0             # "*" == "*" → LOGIN ACCEPTED

Neither piece is wrong in isolation. musl's return value is correct per its API. OpenSSH's salt-borrowing was a legitimate security fix. But together they create an authentication bypass.


Affected Systems

A system is vulnerable only if all five conditions hold:

# Condition Detail
1 musl libc Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto (with TCLIBC=musl), postmarketos, void-musl, chimera
2 No PAM sshd built without PAM or configured with UsePAM no. Alpine's default openssh-server package. openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes is safe.
3 PasswordAuthentication yes This is the OpenSSH default.
4 Account with * root, key-only users, directory-synced accounts, or the alpine user on cloud images
5 A real $5$/$6$ hash exists At least one other local account must have a SHA-256 or SHA-512 password hash (someone ran passwd)

Not Affected

  • glibc systems: Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, RHEL, CentOS — glibc's crypt() returns NULL on failure, never "*".
  • libxcrypt systems: Returns "*0" or "*1", not a bare "*".
  • PAM-enabled systems: sshd bypasses the non-PAM password path entirely when UsePAM yes.
  • OpenBSD, FreeBSD, macOS: Different code paths and libc implementations.

CVSS Assessment

Metric Value
CVSS v3.1 8.1 High — AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Vector Network (remote)
Attack Complexity High (requires specific account/hash layout on target)
Privileges Required None
User Interaction None
Scope Unchanged
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability High

No CVSS v4.0 score has been published by MITRE, NVD, GitHub, or Red Hat as of the date of this article.


Exploitation Status

Public PoC: Yes — available at github.com/oz9un/sshole with a Docker-based reproduction environment and an automated attack script.

In-the-wild exploitation: Threat intelligence firm Previdian reported observing the first exploitation attempt less than nine hours after CVE publication. Eight attempts were logged from a single IP address geolocated to Japan (89.116.89.18). The attacker successfully gained root on a honeypot running real Alpine Linux and OpenSSH, running reconnaissance commands (id, uname, hostname) through non-interactive sessions.

CISA has not yet added this vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.


Detection: How to Check If You're Affected

Run the official check script:

curl -sO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oz9un/sshole/main/check.sh
sudo sh check.sh

The script reports whether all five exploit conditions are met and lists which accounts are exposed.

Manual Detection

Check these on any suspected host:

# Verify musl libc
ldd /usr/sbin/sshd | grep musl

# Check PAM status
sshd -T | grep usepam
# "usepam no" or "usepam (unspecified)" = potentially affected

# Check PasswordAuthentication
grep PasswordAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# "yes" = vulnerable if other conditions met

# List accounts with * password field
awk -F: '($2 == "*" || $2 == "!") {print $1}' /etc/shadow

# Check for any SHA-crypt hashes on the system
grep -E '^\w+:\$5\$|^\w+:\$6\$' /etc/shadow

Log-Based Detection

Search authentication logs for entries that should not exist:

grep "Accepted password for" /var/log/auth.log | grep -E "root|alpine|deploy|key-only"

Any such entry on an account configured with * as its password field indicates a successful bypass.


Remediation

Immediate Fix: Upgrade and Restart

OpenSSH upstream:

# Compile from source or use your distribution's package
# OpenSSH 10.6p2 (commit 4353fdc43)

Alpine Linux (all branches):

apk upgrade openssh
# Then restart the daemon — upgrading does not replace the running process
rc-service sshd restart
Alpine Branch Fixed Package Version
edge 10.6_p2-r0
3.24 10.3_p1-r2
3.23 10.2_p1-r1
3.22 10.0_p1-r11
3.21 9.9_p2-r1
3.20 9.7_p1-r6
3.19 9.6_p1-r3
3.18 9.3_p2-r4
3.17 9.1_p1-r7
3.16 9.0_p1-r6

Point releases: 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, and 3.24.4 carry the fix. Even EOL branches (3.16–3.20) received backports.

Critical: Upgrading the package does not restart the running sshd daemon. You must restart it manually. Verify with:

readlink /proc/$(pgrep sshd)/exe
# Should NOT show "(deleted)" — that means the old binary is still running

Workaround (If You Cannot Patch Immediately)

Set PasswordAuthentication no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config:

PasswordAuthentication no

Then restart sshd. This completely closes the vulnerability at the cost of disabling password-based SSH login — which is recommended practice for any production system anyway.

Warning: Check for Match blocks in sshd_config that might re-enable password authentication for specific users or groups.

Additional Hardening

  • Restrict SSH access to known IP ranges (office, corporate VPN) using AllowUsers, AllowGroups, or firewall rules
  • Use key-based authentication exclusively — disable password logins permanently
  • Monitor /var/log/auth.log for "Accepted password for" entries on accounts that should only accept keys
  • Review authorized_keys files and doas/sudo configurations for unexpected access

Impact Analysis

Direct Impact

An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability gains:

  • Full shell access to the targeted account
  • No credentials required — no password, no SSH key, no brute-forcing
  • One connection is sufficient — it works every time, no retries needed
  • Potential root escalation on Alpine cloud images where the alpine user has passwordless doas

Attack Chain on Cloud Images

On default Alpine AWS/Azure/GCP cloud images:

  1. Attacker SSHes to the instance with a 257+ byte password
  2. Logs in as the alpine user (which has * in /etc/shadow)
  3. Runs doas to escalate to root
  4. Full system compromise

The default PermitRootLogin prohibit-password blocks direct root login, but the alpine user's passwordless doas provides an alternative escalation path.


Why This Matters for DevOps and Infrastructure Teams

*sshole is particularly dangerous because:

  1. Alpine Linux is ubiquitous in containers. The vast majority of Docker images built from alpine or alpine:latest are affected if they install openssh-server. CI/CD runners, build agents, and microservices often run on Alpine.
  2. The vulnerability dates to 2016. It has been present for a decade, hidden behind the default configuration of one of the most popular container base images.
  3. Exploitation requires no reconnaissance. An attacker only needs a guessed username (root, alpine, deploy are all common) and a long password. No fingerprinting or enumeration is required.
  4. The fix is trivial but often missed. Upgrading OpenSSH does not restart the daemon. Many administrators patch and move on, leaving the vulnerable binary running indefinitely.
  5. AI-driven discovery means more vulnerabilities like this will emerge. Özgün Kültekin discovered *sshole using AI agents that ran approximately 17,600 authentication tests across different OpenSSH configurations. This suggests that automated vulnerability discovery is becoming a significant threat vector — and that there may be other latent bugs waiting to be found.

Timeline

Date Event
2012 musl's crypt() begins returning "*" on failure; 256-byte key limit introduced
2016 OpenSSH fixes CVE-2016-6210 (username enumeration) by borrowing salts for locked accounts
2016–2026 Vulnerability exists unexploited in the wild
Nov 2026 Researcher discovers *sshole using AI-driven fuzzing (~17,600 tests)
2026-11-04 Vulnerability reported to OpenSSH by Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield
2026-11-05 OpenSSH releases 10.6p2; Alpine publishes patched packages for all branches
2026-11-05 CVE-2026-123158 assigned by MITRE; PoC published on GitHub
2026-11-05 (<9hrs) First exploitation attempts observed from Japan; root access confirmed on honeypot

References